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Abstract 
Most scholarly research favors intervention of a regional International Organization to end civil 
war. However, the League of Arab States has not been able to end the civil war in Syria. This 
paper tries to find out which factors contributed to that. Using official documents of the 
organization, different governments and the UN, supplemented with media accounts, a picture 
is formed of what went wrong. This is compared to an ideal picture, derived from a theory by 
Gartner, who came up with ten factors that are likely to determine the failure of civil war 
intervention by International Organizations. In the end, it appeared that not the organization, 
but the nature of the conflict was the main reason why intervention failed. However, there were 
many discrepancies with the theory. Therefore, this study not only gives an overview of what 
happened in Syria, but also contributes to the understanding of this theory, and to the 
understanding of the intervention of International Organizations in civil war in general. 
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Introduction 
Regional international organizations (IOs) play a significant role in international politics. Yet, 
the role they play in civil war has been less studied. That makes it interesting to look at how 
they behave in those occasions, and why. The Syrian civil war, which started in 2011 as part of 
the Arab Spring, offers an ideal opportunity for that. An important regional IO in that region is 
the League of Arab States (LAS), of which all Arab countries are member states. The LAS has 
tried to end the violence in Syria between 2011 and 2014, but did not succeed. Therefore, this 
research will investigate the mechanisms that shaped the unsuccessful outcome of the LAS 
intervention in Syria by using the method of process tracing.  
 
The research question that will be addressed is: 
Which factors contributed most to the failure of the LAS intervention in the Syrian civil 
 war? 
 
This has both academic and policy relevancies. For political scientists it is interesting to get a 
better understanding of the behavior of IOs in civil conflict. Much is still to learn both about 
the way in which a regional IO influences a conflict-torn member state and about the way this 
state influences the IO. In addition, for policy makers within IOs it is important to know how 
those processes operate, in order to be aware of the mechanisms that influence them in case of 
civil war in one of the member states. Just alike, it is important for governments of states facing 
a civil war to know in which way interaction with an IO can lead to a certain outcome. All this 
might be helpful in finding a quicker solution to the problem of civil war.  
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Literature review 
 
There are four important broad theories about the integration of IOs. They form the basis for 
investigation of integration of specific IOs. Next to that, research has been done about the best 
way to intervene in civil war. Finally, there is literature concerning intervention in civil war by 
regional IOs. 
 
Main theories about IOs 
One major theory about the integration of IOs is realism. In the realist view, international 
politics has not fundamentally changed since the rise of IOs, for the relative power of states still 
determines the outcomes of the international political process (Mearshimer, 1994, pp. 12-14). 
A second major theory is liberal-institutionalism. According to this theory, the dynamics of 
interaction between states within an IO is fundamentally different from that without one. IOs 
are very beneficial to cooperation and therefore, an IO becomes more than the mere sum of its 
member states (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985, pp. 249-250). A variant of this is the collective-
security theory, which sees IOs only as watchers over international peace. All member states 
agree on not-going to war with one another. When any state breaks this rule, the others will 
work together to battle against this cheater and restore peace (Bennett & Lepgold, 1993, pp. 
215-216, 220-222). Lastly, constructivist theory states that IOs are tools to create international 
norms and values about proper state behavior. Those are created by intellectual elites, who use 
IOs to spread them across the world, until certain behavior has become normal (Cox, 1981, pp. 
135-138). 
 
Specific theories about IOs 
Empirical research to those theories shows that in many instances, reality can be explained by 
a mixture of those theories. For example, the European Union came into existence to create a 
balance of power that would maintain peace in Europe. That can be interpreted as a 
confirmation of realist theory. But further European integration, which was mainly economical, 
had not so much to do with keeping peace as with offering economic opportunities to all 
member states. That is in line with a liberal-institutionalist way of thinking, so this case shows 
that a mix of theories can be in play (Hall, 2012, p. 233). 
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A double case study by Ripsman (2012) leads to the conclusion that states determine the 
moment that war ends and negative peace starts. This is in line with realist thinking that the 
state is a sovereign actor. But according to that same research, positive peace, which means 
mutual understanding and harmony between states, is created by economic interdependence 
and a shared set of norms and values between the states. Those are liberal and constructivist 
concepts. 
 
However, most empirical research of the behavior of IOs uses only one of these theories. For 
example, a research by Donno (2010) only looks at the behavior of states within an IO. She 
starts with the idea that states are sovereign actors, even within an IO. Her conclusion can be 
interpreted as realist, for she claims that member states of an IO react to cheaters within the 
organization in a way that is dependent on the available information and the relative power of 
the cheater. The norm-shaping role of the IO is apparently not important, for only power and 
information matter. 
 
A different statistical research, confirming liberal-institutionalist theory, is provided by 
Pevenhouse (2002). He investigated the behavior of newly formed democracies. It turned out 
that membership of an IO is a way for newly established democracies to stay democratic. It is 
namely a means to show sincere commitments and it raises audience and monetary costs of 
turning into an autocracy. The international negotiation-credibility of the government comes at 
stake as well. So he observed that an IO is essentially different from a group of states. 
 
Specific theories about intervention 
Besides integration of IOs, the best way to intervene in civil conflict is researched as well. 
According to Regan (1996), the ideal third-party intervention comprises combined economical 
and military measures. The fastest way to end it, seen loose from any values, is to choose side 
of the government, for that is mostly the strongest party. This argument is confirmed and 
elaborated by Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce (2008), who conclude that intervention by 
assisting all the parties will result in a longer duration of civil war. Assisting only one of them 
will result in a quick ending of hostilities, either by victory or by a peace settlement. When a 
war becomes more expensive, a peace settlement is difficult to achieve and victory for one of 
the parties is most probable. 
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Specific theories about intervention by IOs 
Those two subjects are combined in a number of studies concerning intervention in civil war 
by a regional IO. Most of those researches use liberal-institutionalist ideas or come to 
conclusions that are in line with liberal institutionalism. Gartner (2011) shows statistically that 
mediation by IOs is useful to end civil wars, since they are reliable mediators. They share a 
common culture, norms and values; they have something to lose by the conflict and they are 
not associated with former colonial oppressors (Gartner, 2011, pp. 382-383). This elaborates 
the statement of Bercovitch & Houston (1993), who claim that mediation is best done by high-
rank diplomats, who actively seek mediation and preserve a good relation with the parties they 
mediated between. According to Abbott & Snidal (1998), IOs are effective mediators, for they 
can operate more independently than states and they can work full-time on the coordination of 
collective activities. Therefore, they have freedom, time and means to mediate. All these 
researches show that IOs can be more than the sum of its member states. 
 
Frazier and Dixon (2007) combine the liberal-institutionalist with the constructivist view, when 
they claim, using a statistical study, that IOs can help to end civil war. According to them, IOs 
centralize international norms and values, which is a really constructivist way of thinking. 
Above that, IOs are more independent and have more legitimization than single countries. That 
is of course a confirmation of the research done by Abbott and Snidal (1998) and is in line with 
liberal-institutionalism. 
 
Theoretical gap: the case of the League of Arab States 
Given those conclusions about the usefulness of regional IOs in mediating civil conflict, the 
question arises why this does not apply to the LAS. It is a regional IO with maintaining 
collective security as one of its goals and it is based on the common Arab culture of all its 
member states (Dakhlallah, 2012, pp. 399-400). It has faced several civil wars within its 
member states throughout its history that it was not able to solve (Dakhlallah, 2012, pp. 406-
407). This is evident even in the recent past, since the LAS took measures against both Libya 
and Syria in 2011 because their respective regimes used violence against civilians during the 
Arab Spring (Ould Mohamedou, 2016, p. 1227). However, this did not result in an ending of 
the violence in Syria, and although Libya eventually got a regime change, both Libya and Syria 
were in 2017 involved in civil war (Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2017). 
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These cases contradict the aforementioned theories favoring regional IO-intervention in civil 
conflict. In his article, Gartner comes up with a theory based on a statistical analysis of 1538 
cases, that tries to identify the factors that contribute to the failure of regional IO-interventions 
(Gartner, 2011, p. 384). In the LAS case however, specific factors might be in play that do not 
operate in other parts of the world. Therefore, an in-depth case study is necessary, especially 
for the Syrian case, in which hundreds of thousands of people are killed since 2011 (Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program, 2017), notwithstanding the LAS efforts to end the conflict. 
 
This leads back to the research question: 
 Which factors contributed most to the failure of the LAS intervention in the Syrian civil 
 war? 
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Theoretical Framework 
 
The aim of this research is to find the factors that contributed most to the failure of the LAS 
intervention in the Syrian civil war. That asks for an inductive approach, in which the series of 
events in Syria must be scrutinized, looking for possible explanations. However, working 
purely inductively, and especially determining what is relevant, is very difficult. Therefore, the 
aforementioned theory of Gartner (2011) will be used as a framework to compare to the actual 
events in Syria. This comparison will show which parts of his theory predicted the outcome in 
Syria best and which parts appeared not to apply at all. Next to that, an attempt will be done to 
find other factors that influenced the events in Syria. This will lead to a better understanding of 
the Syrian situation specifically and to find the limitations of this theory more generally. 
 
This chapter will first explain the theory and its core concepts. After that, a series of hypotheses 
will provide the picture of a hypothetical situation in which the theory of Gartner had predicted 
the Syrian case completely right.  
 
The theory of Gartner  
In his article, Gartner favors intervention by regional IOs in civil conflict. However, he also has 
an eye for the disadvantages and pitfalls of this kind of intervention. First, rebels are mostly 
supported by a neighboring country, which is often member of the same IO. This makes the IO 
indecisive in how to operate and which side to choose. Second, the state the rebels are fighting 
against is member of the same IO that tries to reconcile them. This can make the IO as a 
mediator unacceptable to the rebels. Third, the political course of regional IOs has often proved 
to be changeable due to a shifting power balance in the region, which makes it questionable 
whether it will keep its promises. Fourth, other member states can try to deter rebels in their 
own country and therefore take severe measures in solving the civil conflict abroad, which 
makes them as mediators unattractive to the rebels.  And fifth, rebels often try to play off 
different mediators against one another. Therefore, they are not willing the mediators to 
cooperate and coordinate joint action in a regional IO. For those reasons, regional IO-
intervention might be difficult in civil wars (Gartner, 2011, p. 383). 
 
This adds up, according to Gartner, to the difficulties in solving civil war that are problematic 
to any kind of mediator, not just a regional IO. First, a civil war is mostly very asymmetrical, 
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with government forces far stronger than insurgent groups. This makes the government 
unwilling to negotiate, since it can easily win militarily. Second, starting mediation is difficult, 
for the moment that peace talks with the insurgents begin, they are granted status equal to the 
government. This again creates a disincentive for the government to negotiate. Third, insurgent 
groups are not officially accountable to anyone, and therefore they are not trustworthy to keep 
their part of any negotiated settlement. Fourth, civil wars are often about indivisible matters, 
like the control over an area or the entire state. Those kinds of disputes are especially difficult 
to negotiate, for they are zero-sum. Fifth and last, a civil war is often considered a domestic 
problem and any kind of intervention is a violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity. All 
these reasons make a civil war difficult to solve by any mediator (Gartner, 2011, p. 382). 
 
Concepts 
The concepts in this theory require a clear definition. The first one is ‘International 
Organization’, for which the definition will be used as formulated by Barkin (2013) and used 
by most other researchers as well. According to him, an International Organization is an 
“inclusive intergovernmental organization” (Barkin, 2013, p. 1). This research focuses on 
regional IOs, which are IOs that only states within the specific region can join (Barkin, 2013, 
p. 2). 
 
Intervention in civil conflict is defined as any attempt of a third party to influence the outcome 
and/or the duration of the conflict. This can be economic support for one or all parties, military 
intervention or facilitation of negotiations. 
 
The terms ‘civil conflict’ and ‘civil war’ refer to warfare within one state, in which the state is 
one of the fighting parties, by which at least 1000 people have died in one year and by which 
the legitimacy of the state is challenged (Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, p. 4). This definition is 
widely used in research about civil warfare, although any threshold considering the number of 
casualties is of course arbitrary. It is important to note here that any war that takes place within 
a state, in which the state is one of the fighting parties and a non-state actor another, is labeled 
as ‘civil war’. Of course, it can be a kind of proxy-war between different states who in fact fight 
an interstate war within one country. However, the research is about IO-intervention, which 
will make a sort of proxy war out of any civil war, for other IO member states get involved in 
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it. Therefore, intervention of other states will not matter for the definition of ‘civil war’ in this 
research. 
 
Hypotheses 
For this investigation, the theory of Gartner will be compared to the case of the LAS 
intervention in the Syrian civil war. The theory states that the reason for failure of intervention 
in civil war is dividable in two groups of five factors each. The first set of factors addresses the 
particular problems of intervention by a regional IO, in this case the LAS, whereas the second 
set addresses the problem of mediating civil conflict in general. The following hypotheses 
display the situation in Syria as would be expected following Gartner’s theory. This has to be 
compared with the actual situation in order to see to what extent the expectation is right. 
However, there might have been also other factors contributing to the failure of the LAS 
intervention in Syria, which Gartner’s theory did not foresee. Therefore, it is necessary to look 
for them as well. 
 
H1: The Syrian rebel groups are supported by other member states of the LAS, which makes 
the LAS indecisive. 
H2: Syria itself is a member of the LAS, which makes the LAS unacceptable as a mediator to 
the rebels. 
H3: The political course of the LAS has proven to be inconsistent. 
H4: Other LAS-members favor a harsh repression of the rebels, because they run the risk of 
rebellion themselves. 
H5: The Syrian rebel groups try to play off different LAS member states against each other. 
 
H6: Government forces in Syria are far stronger than insurgent groups. 
H7: The Syrian government does not want to negotiate with rebels. 
H8: Syrian rebel groups haven proven unreliable negotiating partners. 
H9: The dispute between the Syrian government and the rebels is about a zero-sum issue. 
H10: Third parties are hesitant to intervene in a Syrian domestic matter. 
 
H11:  There are other reasons that the LAS intervention did not succeed.  
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Operationalization 
Methodology 
To test the applicability of the hypotheses and similarly look for other factors that might have 
had their influence as well, the research will be executed by process tracing. This means that 
all events that have something to do with the LAS intervention in Syria must be identified. 
Those are acts and statements of the LAS, the UN, the Syrian government and the rebels. 
Especially the statements of the LAS about its own actions are very useful to this, but will need 
of course support from government correspondence, UN reports and overviews of the daily 
events in the civil war. This will provide a picture of the actual events that have taken place 
with the reasons why they happened, based on the sources. After that, it will be compared to 
the hypotheses, to look whether one or more of them can explain what happened, or that the 
factors fall outside of them. This will finally lead to a conclusion and an answer to the research 
question about the reasons why the LAS intervention in Syria failed. 
 
Since it is difficult to come up with new factors during the research, a new factor has to be 
explicitly mentioned in the sources and considered relevant by researched actors themselves, 
who can be the LAS, but also the UN, the Syrian government or the rebels, before it is proposed.   
 
Case selection 
As the research question already implies, the case that will be examined is the Syrian civil war, 
which has started, following the aforementioned definition of civil war, in 2011 (Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program, 2017). The period before the civil war broke out is not relevant since 
the research question is about efforts to end it. Most efforts on behalf of the LAS to intervene 
were in the period between the start of the war in 2011 and the moment that the LAS stopped 
cooperation with the UN by the person of a joint special envoy for Syria in 2014 (UN office in 
Geneva, 2018), so this period will be investigated. It consists of four periods. The first ranges 
from 2011 to 23 February 2012 when the LAS acted mostly alone. The second ranges from 23 
February to 2 August 2012, when Kofi Annan was joint UN/LAS special envoy for Syria 2014 
(UN office in Geneva, 2018). In the third, from 2 August 2012 to 31 May 2014, Lakhdar 
Brahimi held that office (UN office in Geneva, 2018). The last period ranges from Brahimi’s 
resignation on 31 May to 7 September 2014, when the LAS decided to start no new efforts to 
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end the Syrian crisis (League of Arab States, 2014). For each of those periods, the factors 
relevant for the LAS failure will be identified. 
 
Variables 
The dependent variable in this research is the failure of the LAS intervention in Syria. Every 
hypothesis contains a different independent variable. Those are for the first group of hypotheses 
respectively: the support by other LAS member states for Syrian rebel groups; the acceptability 
for the LAS as a mediator to the rebels; the record of the political course of the LAS in its 
history; the risk of rebellion in other LAS member states; and the activity of rebel groups to 
play LAS member states off against each other. 
 
The support for rebel groups by other LAS members is measured using declarations from the 
LAS concerning the rebels. The willingness of the rebels to talk to the LAS is an indicator of 
the organization’s acceptability to them. The political course of the LAS is not traced over the 
73 years of its existence. Instead, only its course during the four years under investigation is 
examined, and any conclusions about this hypothesis should therefore be very cautious. Both 
the risk of rebellion in other member states and the behavior of the rebel groups becomes clear 
out of statements by the LAS, its member states and the United Nations. 
 
For the second group of hypotheses the independent variables are the relative strength of Syrian 
government forces compared to that of insurgent groups; the willingness of the Syrian 
government to negotiate with the insurgents; the record of reliability of the rebel groups; the 
issue that the conflict is about; and the willingness of third parties to intervene in Syria.  
 
The relative strength is not measured precisely. The hypothesis is that Syrian forces are far 
stronger, and if that is the case, they would have won the war by 2014 or at least made enormous 
progress in decimating the rebels. In that case, this hypothesis is confirmed, otherwise it must 
be rejected. The willingness of the government and the rebel forces to negotiate with each other 
can be observed by declarations of the two parties and reports on actual negotiations between 
them. The reliability of the rebels is measured by looking for commitments they made and for 
reports about their implementation. Whether the conflict is about a zero-sum issue becomes 
clear from the standpoints the parties take at the beginning of negotiations or in declarations to 
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institutions or media. The willingness of third parties to intervene can be traced in what is said 
about sovereignty and intervention in official declarations. 
 
However, since this research tries to find the reasons for failure, other independent variables 
might play a role as well. Therefore, in line with H11, the research ties to identify influential 
factors that show up at crucial moments that might be in play. 
 
Source selection 
The process tracing is based on official reports of the LAS and the UN Security Council 
(UNSC). For the research, it is assumed that these reports are sufficiently representative for real 
events to test the hypotheses. However, the official website of the LAS is for large parts in 
Arabic, so it is difficult to find reports on LAS meetings. The final declaration of a LAS summit 
in March 2012 is available in English (League of Arab States, 2012a), just like a summary of 
the final declaration of their March 2013 summit (League of Arab States, 2013). The resolutions 
they accepted are accessible via the archive of the UNSC (League of Arab States, 2012b; 2014). 
For the UN documents, a webpage is used with a list of all UN documents on the Syrian civil 
war (securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/syria/), which also contains correspondence from 
the LAS and individual governments to the UNSC. To support those documents and to get more 
information about the course of small events that the institutions neglected, the data are 
supplemented with media accounts.  
 
Since media can always be biased, it is used as a support for the official documents only. It is 
necessary to use them, for they cover a lot more events than the official documentation of the 
LAS and the UN, and the succession of those events might have influenced the outcome of the 
LAS intervention in Syria. Furthermore, since no official documentation of the rebels is 
available, their actions and statements are accessible only via media accounts. Since a thorough 
analysis of all different media reporting on Syria goes beyond the scope of this research, only 
four different media sources are used.  
 
In an attempt to get a picture as reliable as possible, the chosen sources are based in different 
parts of the world. The first two come from the Middle East: Al-Arabiya and Al-Jazeera. They 
report on their own region, so they provide a lot of information on Syria, although with a high 
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risk of biases. The other two come from other parts of the world: the British BBC News and 
the Russian Sputnik International. 
 
To find the information needed, in the search engines of the respective media websites, the 
words “arab league” are searched. The resulting articles in the period 2011-2014 are used for 
this research. Again, journalist reports bare a high risk of biasedness, so they are only used to 
support the official documentation. Conclusions based on media sources only cannot be very 
convincing.  
 
In the end, this information leads to a picture of the factors that influenced the failure of the 
LAS intervention in Syria most. On top of that, it also provides a confirmation or rejection of 
each hypothesis. It answers the research question and at the same time confirms or rejects the 
applicability of Gartner’s theory to the Syrian case. Confirmation of that theory will make it 
more robust. New factors that were no part of the theory will lead to a proposal for change of 
or addition to the theory, although that would be based on the Syrian case only. Therefore, large 
changes in the theory based on this research would deserve more research on other cases as 
well. 
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Results and analysis 
 
Now, for each of the four defined periods, an overview is given of the main acts of the LAS, 
the UN, the Syrian government and the rebels, in order to find out which factors contributed to 
the failure of the LAS and to what extent that corresponds with the hypotheses based on 
Gartner’s theory. The discussion of the relevant factors immediately follows each of the 
overviews. 
 
The LAS acting alone: 2011 – 23 February 2012 
On 8 August 2011, the LAS strongly condemned the Syrian violence and called for an end of 
it (Al-Jazeera, 8-8-2011; Sputnik International, 8-8-2011). Two months later, a UNSC 
resolution that called for political change in Syria was vetoed by Russia and China (UNSC, 
2011). In that same month, the LAS called for a national dialogue in Syria between the 
government and the opposition (Al-Jazeera, 17-10-2011; BBC, 17-10-2011). On October 29, 
the Arab foreign ministers called Assad again to stop killing civilians (Al-Arabiya, 29-10-2011; 
Al-Jazeera, 29-10-2011; BBC, 29-10-2011). On 30 October 2011, Syria warned the west not to 
intervene (Al-Jazeera, 30-10-2011; BBC, 30-10-2011), and one day thereafter, the NATO ruled 
out any military intervention (Al-Arabiya, 31-10-2011; Al-Jazeera, 31-10-2011).  
 
 On November 2, the Syrian government agreed with a LAS proposal to settle the conflict 
peacefully, (UNSC, 2012a). However, the opposition did not agree, for it did not believe that 
Assad was sincere (Al-Jazeera, 3-11-2011; Sputnik International, 3-11-2011). 
 
In November 2011, the LAS suspended Syria’s membership, despite the Syrian protest that that 
was a violation of the LAS charter (Al-Arabiya, 12-11-2011; Al-Jazeera, 13-11-2011; Sputnik 
International, 12-11-2011; BBC, 12-11-2011). Furthermore, it applied economic sanctions to 
the Syrian regime (Al-Arabiya, 27-11-2011; Al-Jazeera, 28-11-2011; Sputnik International, 27-
11-2011; BBC, 27-11-2011). On November 16, the LAS gave Syria an ultimatum: in three 
days, the violence must have stopped (Al-Arabiya, 16-11-2011; BBC, 16-11-2011). One day 
later, this period was prolonged with three more days (Al-Jazeera, 17-11-2011; Sputnik 
International, 17-11-2011).  
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When the Syrian government agreed to a LAS peace plan on 19 December 2011, it underscored 
that this was no violation of its sovereignty (Al-Arabiya, 19-12-2011; Al-Jazeera, 19-12-2011; 
BBC, 19-12-2011). To supervise the implementation of the plan, the LAS sent an observer 
mission in December 2011 and January 2012, (Head of the LAS observer mission, 2012). It 
had arrived only one day before at least 44 people died in two suicide bombings in Damascus 
(Al-Arabiya, 23-12-2011; Al-Jazeera, 23-11-2011). During the mission, Qatar proposed to send 
military LAS troops to Syria (Al-Arabiya, 15-1-2012, Al-Jazeera, 14-1-2012; Sputnik 
International, 17-1-2012). However, the Assad government opposed this, since it would only 
worsen the situation and endanger the progression already booked. Above that, it could be a 
first step to foreign intervention.  (Al-Arabiya, 17-1-2012; Al-Jazeera, 17-1-2012; Sputnik 
International, 17-1-2012). And although the head of the mission was cautiously positive about 
the results of his mission (Head of the LAS observer mission, 2012), the mission was paused 
on January 24, due to further worsening of the situation (Al-Arabiya, 28-1-2012; Al-Jazeera, 
29-1-2012; Sputnik International, 29-1-2012; BBC, 28-1-2012). The head of the mission (2012) 
explicitly mentioned the opposition as perpetrators of violence, and observed that the 
government had halted practically all of it. 
 
On 23 January 2012, the LAS presented a new peace plan: within two months, Assad should 
resign in favor of his vice president, who should form a government of national unity, 
acceptable to all parties (Al-Jazeera, 23-1-2012; Sputnik International, 23-1-2012; BBC, 23-1-
2012). The Syrian government rejected this plan as a violation of its sovereignty (Al-Jazeera, 
23-1-2012; BBC, 23-12-2012). 
 
On January 30, the Russian government stated that it had proposed to host peace talks in 
Moscow. According to the Kremlin, the Syrian government had agreed to that, the opposition 
had not. (Al-Arabiya, 30-1-2012; Al-Jazeera, 31-1-2012; Sputnik International, 30-1-2012). A 
draft UNSC resolution of 4 February 2012 welcomed this Russian initiative and fully supported 
the LAS plan of January 22 (UNSC, 2012a). However, Russia and China vetoed this. 
 
On February 4, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that called the UN and the LAS 
to appoint a joint special envoy in order to promote “a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis” 
(UNGA, 2012a). Two days later, former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan was appointed in 
this position (UN office in Geneva, 2018). 
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Discussion 
It is clear that in this period, several factors contributed to the failure of settling the conflict. 
First, as was already predicted in H10, the fact that it concerned a Syrian domestic matter, 
complicated the situation. On October 30, the Syrian government explicitly warned against 
foreign intervention, resulting in NATO’s rejection to interfere. When Syria agreed to a plan 
on December 19, it considered it necessary to underscore explicitly that their sovereignty was 
not violated, whereas the new plan of January 23 was rejected as a violation of sovereignty. 
However, H10 predicted that third parties would be hesitant to intervene, but except the NATO, 
no third party mentioned anything like that. The Syrian government rejected the plans for 
sovereignty reasons, whereas the LAS was not reluctant in making up plans and sending an 
observer mission. 
 
Another factor, that was not predicted by any hypothesis, is the veto of Russia and China in the 
UNSC. In both October 2011 and February 2012, the council was not able to take a decision. 
Therefore, the UN did nothing until its General Assembly decided to appoint a special envoy. 
 
Contrary to what was predicted in H1, the fact that LAS member states supported the rebels 
was no reason for indecisiveness. The entire LAS decided to suspend Syria’s membership, so 
even though they chose side with the rebels by this move, they acted as a unitary bloc that was 
able to decide.  
 
H2 can also be rejected for this period. The rebels had no reason to distrust the LAS, for it 
suspended the membership of the Syrian government. This could have turned the situation 
around, but also the government continued to cooperate with the LAS, although it opposed its 
suspension. As a result, in December, they could reach an agreement and observers could enter 
the country. 
 
Also the unwillingness of the opposition appeared to be an important factor. On November 2, 
it did not agree to a LAS peace plan for it did not trust the government. Furthermore, when 
Russia proposed peace talks on January 30, only the government wanted to negotiate. 
Therefore, H7 has to be dismissed as well, which predicted that the government would not want 
to negotiate with rebels for that would grant them equal status. The observer missions’ head 
reported that the government had stopped almost all of its violence, whereas the opposition 
continued to fight. H8 should therefore also be dismissed: the opposition was not unreliable in 
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negotiations, it did not negotiate at all. This might be a consequence of the zero-sumness of the 
conflict that is predicted by H9: the opposition did not want to talk to a president it did not trust, 
whereas the government rejected the January 23 plan that contained Assad’s resignation. 
However, this is not very explicit in the sources, so it will need more support from the later 
periods before something can be concluded about this hypothesis. 
 
Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan: 23 February – 2 August 2012 
After Annan’s appointment, the LAS called for independent investigation of the death of 
civilians (Sputnik International, 13-3-2012; BBC, 13-3-2012) at the same day that Assad 
announced presidential elections for May 7 (Al-Arabiya, 13-3-2012; Al-Jazeera, 13-3-2012). 
Three days later, Annan presented a ‘six points plan’ for a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis. 
It consisted of “an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations 
and concerns of the Syrian people”; a UN-supervised cessation of all violence from all parties, 
including the retreat of troops and heavy weapons in populated areas; “provision of 
humanitarian assistance”; release of prisoners who were involved in “peaceful political 
activities”; freedom to move within the country for journalists; and ensured freedom of 
association and demonstration right (Annan, 2012a). On March 21, the UNSC (2012b) 
explicitly supported this plan in an official statement. 
 
On March 27, the Syrian government declared itself willing to implement the six points plan 
(Al-Arabiya, 27-3-2012; Al-Jazeera, 27-3-2012; BBC, 28-3-2012; Sputnik International, 27-3-
2012). One day thereafter however, it stormed a rebel bastion (Al-Arabiya, 28-3-2012; Al-
Jazeera, 28-3-2012; BBC, 28-3-2012). In the meantime, in Baghdad, the LAS declared on its  
summit to fully support the demands of the Syrian people, condemn all violence, demand all 
the bloodshed to be stopped, reject all foreign interference “in order to preserve the unity of 
Syria and the safety of its people”, support the mission of Annan and stress the necessity of 
immediate implementation of his six points plan (League of Arab States, 2012a). 
 
In the same period, several opposition groups declared loyalty to the Syrian National Coalition 
(Al-Arabiya, 28-3-2012; Sputnik International, 27-3-2012). 
 
On April 1, the Syrian government accepted a proposal from Annan to withdraw all military 
units from populated areas and set out a complete ceasefire no later than the morning of April 
17 
 
12. (Annan, 2012b). On April 5, the UNSC brought out a statement supporting this agreement 
and called for direct implementation of the six points plan. (UNSC, 2012c). Annan reported 
that in the days between the agreement and the implementation day of the ceasefire, Assad did 
not show any good intentions in ceasing the violence. To the contrary, Annan wrote that “recent 
events are deeply concerning”, but that the other five points of the six points plan were 
cautiously implemented (Annan, 2012b). On April 8, the Syrian government came up with new 
conditions for the ceasefire. It wanted immediate disarmament of all armed groups, written 
assurances that they were prepared to halt their violence and the guarantee of countries in the 
region that they would finance nor arm opposition groups (Annan, 2012b). According to Annan, 
this would endagnger the six points plan. However, the Syrian minister of foreign affairs 
responded that written assurances were not necessary, if they could get some guarantee that the 
armed groups would cease their violence when the ceasefire would start. That was necessary, 
according to him, for the earlier LAS observer mission did not result in any commitment of 
opposition groups to end the violence. He denied to have asked for immediate disarmament 
(Al-Moualem, 2012).  
 
When the ceasefire was finally realized, the UNSC adopted on April 14 a resolution that decided 
to send an unarmed observer mission into Syria (UNSMIS) and reaffirmed Syria’s sovereignty 
and integrity (UNSC, 2012d). 
 
On May 29, the secretary-general of the LAS wrote the UNSC that the international observers 
and the joint special envoy reported that the violence was escalating dangerously, especially 
since the “appalling massacre that regular Syrian military troops committed in Hulah” (Elaraby, 
2012). He asked the UNSC to take the necessary measures to protect the Syrian civilians, among 
which should be sending more observers and “granting them the authority they require to put 
an end to the violations and crimes” (Elaraby, 2012). 
 
In a reaction to these events in the town of Hulah, the LAS adopted on June 2 a resolution. It 
condemned the massacre in Hulah and all the violence by the Syrian government, breaking the 
UNSC resolutions. Besides that, it underlined the importance of breaking all diplomatic ties 
with the Syrian government. It called the opposition to discuss their differences in Cairo in 
order to unite and create a roadmap for peaceful transition of power. Furthermore, it planned a 
conference with the aim to create more unity within the opposition. However, it confirmed 
commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Syria (League of Arab States, 2012b).  
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One day earlier, the Russia government had confirmed to continue arms supplies into Syria 
during the conflict, with the remark that the weapons could not be used against citizens (Al-
Jazeera, 1-6-2012; Sputnik International, 1-6-2012). 
 
On June 30, the five permanent UNSC members, Turkey, and LAS members Iraq, Kuwait and 
Qatar attended a conference in Geneva. They agreed on a roadmap for peace in Syria, the 
Geneva communiqué, according to which the six points plan had to be obliged. Thereafter, a 
political settlement would be necessary, to provide perspective for all Syrians, in clear steps, 
following a timetable and leading to a democratic, pluralistic state, complying with 
international rights and the rule of law. A transitional government of national unity should 
organize multiparty elections. The participants to the conference committed themselves to assist 
in this process, respecting Syria’s sovereignty and integrity (UNSC, 2012e).  
 
In a letter from UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon on July 6, he stated that the situation in 
Syria was deteriorating and that the six points plan was not being implemented. Furthermore, 
according to UNSMIS, within and between the several opposition groups were only very loose 
affiliations (UNSC, 2012f). 
 
On August 2, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution (UNGA, 2012b) that expressed 
“deep concern” about “the failure of the Security Council to agree on measures to ensure the 
compliance of Syrian authorities with its decisions” and called for implementation of the six 
points plan and the political transition plan. However, it also reaffirmed “its strong commitment 
to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity” of Syria. 
 
When Annan resigned as joint UN/LAS special envoy for Syria, he declared that his work had 
been difficult, among other reasons because of divisions within the UNSC (Al-Arabiya, 3-8-
2012; Sputnik International, 2-8-2012; BBC, 2-8-2012). 
 
Discussion 
An important factor that contributed to the unsuccessfulness of the LAS intervention in this 
period was the unwillingness of the government to cooperate. One day after the acceptation of 
the six points plan, it stormed a rebel bastion. Furthermore, after having agreed with Annan 
about a ceasefire, it suddenly came up with additional preconditions. And although the ceasefire 
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was implemented and the UNSMIS-observers were present, the Geneva communiqué and the 
UNGA-resolution had to repeat a call for the implementation of the six points plan. This is an 
inverted version of H8, since now the government has shown its unreliability instead of the 
rebels. UNSMIS had reported that the opposition groups had only very loose affiliations with 
each other, which made them as a collective of course unreliable. As already demonstrated, also 
in the previous period, the rebels had shown their unreliability. This created mutual distrust, 
which made the start of negotiations even harder. 
 
Another factor that played its role in the failure of intervention is the unwillingness of the UN 
to intervene, which corresponds to H10. The LAS asked after the Hulah massacre for additional 
measures, but the UN decided not to meet them. This might be because of the Russian veto 
power in the Security Council, which it had used in the previous period already. Russia 
continued its arms supplies to Syria, so it apparently supported the government. It was also 
present at the Geneva conference, of which the final communiqué was very ambiguous about 
Assad’s position in the new transitional government. Annan criticized after his resignation the 
divisions within the UNSC, which also might point towards Russian obstruction, although he 
did not mention Russia explicitly. 
 
The LAS actively encouraged cooperation between different opposition groups in its June 2 
resolution, which could have made the organization an unacceptable mediator to the 
government according to the logic behind H2. However, no clear indications of that are found. 
Neither did it make the LAS indecisive, which was predicted by H1, for all members adopted 
the resolution.  
 
Joint Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi: 2 August 2012 – 31 May 2014 
Lakhdar Brahimi, Annan’s successor as joint UN/LAS special envoy for Syria, managed to 
reach a ceasefire deal for the Eid al-Adha holidays on 26-28 October 2012, but on the 28th, both 
parties already broke it (Al-Arabiya, 21-10-2012; Al-Jazeera, 28-10-2012; Sputnik 
International, 29-10-2012). 
 
On November 12, several groups decided to fuse into the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), 
which got recognition from the LAS as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people (Al-
Arabiya, 12-11-2012; Al-Jazeera, 13-11-2011; Sputnik International, 19-11-2012), but in 
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December, Brahimi talked to government-tolerated opposition groups (Al-Arabiya, 24-12-
2012, Al-Jazeera, 25-12-2012), that apparently existed as well. 
 
On 10 January 2013, Brahimi declared that Assad, whose position was left ambiguous in the 
Geneva communiqué, could not take part in a transition government (Al-Arabiya, 10-1-2013; 
Al-Jazeera, 11-1-2013), for which the Syrian government depicted him as biased (Al-Jazeera, 
11-1-2013). 
 
On the LAS summit in Doha, in March 2013, a representative of the SNC filled the seat of the 
Syrian Arab Republic, instead of the suspended Syrian government (League of Arab States, 
2013). The final declaration of the summit offered each member state the opportunity to provide 
“all means of self-defense, including military support” to the Syrian people. It even called on 
all regional and international organizations to support the enabling of the Syrian people to 
defend themselves. Furthermore, it emphasized the importance of a political solution and it 
condemned “in the strongest terms” the violence of the military against the Syrian people.  
(League of Arab States, 2013).  
 
On 25 April 2013, Jordan’s government wrote to the UNSC that influx of Syrian refugees 
created a security problem in Jordan and the world (Al-Hussein, 2013). On June 6, there were 
reports of Lebanese militias fighting in Syria (Al-Arabiya, 6-6-2013). Two days later, the 
Syrian National Coalition accused Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah to assist the Syrian regime 
(Al-Arabiya, 8-6-2013). 
 
In August 2013, the SNC reported that 650 people had died in a gas attack (Al-Jazeera,21-8-
2013). The LAS called the UN and the international community to take measures against the 
Syrian government, which it held it accountable for the chemical attack (Al-Arabiya, 1-9-2013; 
Al-Jazeera, 2-9-2013; BBC, 2-9-2013).  
 
On 14 September 2013, Russia and the US agreed to a chemical disarmament of Syria, 
according to a letter from the LAS to the UNSC (Abdulaziz & Elaraby, 2013). In reaction to 
that, the LAS stressed in this official letter, dated 24 September 2013, that the council should 
act by establishing “a complete ceasefire on all Syrian territory; prohibiting the use of military 
aircraft, rockets and heavy weapons of all forms against civilians; establishing a mechanism to 
monitor the ceasefire under United Nations supervision; embarking on the process towards a 
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political solution to the crisis; and building momentum for a second Geneva conference” 
(Abdulaziz & Elaraby, 2013). 
 
However, when the UNSC adopted a resolution on 27 September 2013, it only addressed the 
chemical disarmament of Syria and mentioned a “Syrian-led conference” based on the Geneva 
communiqué as the only way to peace (UNSC, 2013).  
 
In October 2013, Brahimi announced that it was difficult to find representatives of the 
opposition that were willing to negotiate with Assad for the Geneva-II peace talks (Al-Arabiya, 
20-10-2013; Al-Jazeera, 20-10-2013). The opposition even considered peace talks impossible 
as long as Assad had not stepped down (Al-Arabiya, 7-11-2013). However, the regime declared 
that Assad would stay in power anyway, whether as head of the current government or as head 
of a new interim government (Al-Arabiya, 4-12-2013). 
 
On 27 December 2013, a terrorist attack stroke the Lebanese capital Beirut, which killed a 
prominent critic of Assad. The Lebanese Hezbollah-party, which is linked to the Iranian 
government, was mentioned as possible perpetrator (Al-Arabiya, 27-12-2013).  
 
The Geneva-II talks between the government and the opposition were finally held in January 
2014, but according to Brahimi, they failed (Al-Arabiya, 3-3-2014; Sputnik International, 26-
6-2014). Unfortunately, no reports of this meeting are accessible. 
 
The UNSC adopted another resolution on 22 February 2014 (UNSC, 2014a), condemning the 
growing number of terrorist attacks and urging all parties to respect human rights and 
humanitarian law. It demanded all parties to work towards the solution of the Geneva 
communiqué and called for free access to the country for humanitarian aid. And despite its 
“strong commitment” to Syrian sovereignty and territorial integrity, it expressed the intent to 
take further steps in case of non-compliance, although those steps were not specified. 
 
The UN secretary-general reported on the Syrian situation on March 24 that in the period from 
February 22 to March 21, there were “indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks […] in 
populated areas” and continuing fights between the government and the opposition. He stated 
that the peace process of Brahimi had produced only very poor results (UNSC, 2014b). 
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On its annual conference in March 2014, the LAS was divided on whether to give the Syrian 
opposition Syria’s seat again. Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria opposed it and finally, the opposition 
was invited and allowed to give a speech, but was not granted the seat (Al-Arabiya, 23-3-2014; 
Al-Jazeera, 25-3-2014). On that summit, Lebanon asked the LAS for help against spillover of 
the Syrian civil war (Al-Arabiya, 24-3-2014; Al-Jazeera, 24-3-2014). 
 
Discussion 
In this period, it is clear that the Syrian government was unreliable. This started with the broken 
ceasefire in October 2012, and as late as March 2014, the UN secretary-general reported about 
attacks in populated areas. These should have stopped already in April 2012 according to 
Annan’s six points plan. This makes also clear that H6 can be dismissed, for three years after 
the protests started, the war still continued. If the government really was far stronger than the 
rebels, at least the first signs of victory should have appeared in 2014, but this was not the case.  
 
The rebels tried to cooperate in November 2012, but were not able to fuse all opposition groups. 
In line with H8, this makes negotiations of course more difficult than negotiations with only 
one group. That is one reason why Brahimi had difficulties finding opposition members for the 
Geneva-II negotiations. A second reason was, as predicted by H9, the zero-sumness of the 
conflict. The opposition wanted the resignation of Assad at any cost, whereas the government 
wanted Assad to stay in power at any cost. Therefore, the government depicted Brahimi as 
biased when he stated that Assad had to leave. At this moment, Brahimi lost some of his 
authority by choosing side of the rebels. This is a variant of H2, for not the rebels, but the 
government saw the mediator as biased. 
 
The LAS in first instance fully supported the rebels. It recognized the newly formed SNC in 
November 12 as Syria’s legitimate representative and it even granted the SNC the Syrian seat 
on the LAS summit of March 2013. The LAS was able to take actions because of its unitary 
support for the opposition, which is completely contrary to H1. However, one year later, the 
LAS became more divided about whether to recognize the SNC.  
 
This was therefore also the first instance that the political course of the LAS became 
inconsistent, as expected by H3. Immediately hereafter, as will be shown in the next subchapter, 
the LAS halted its efforts to find a solution for Syria, and the March 2014 summit has shown 
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the first sign of it. This follows the same logic of H1: not all members shared the same opinion 
and therefore, the organization became indecisive.  
 
In this period, the conflict also started to spillover to neighboring countries. In April 2013, 
Jordan asked for help in dealing with the massive influx of refugees. In December of that same 
year, a terrorist attack killed a prominent opponent of Assad in Lebanon. And in March 2014, 
Lebanon asked for help from the LAS against the Syrian spillover. According to H4, Lebanon 
and Jordan would plea for harsh suppression of the rebels, which would make the LAS an 
unacceptable mediator for the rebels. A sign of this might be observed in Lebanon opposing the 
SNC’s presence at the March 2014 summit. However, Jordan did not oppose that, whereas 
Algeria did. The correlation between the spillover of the conflict and opposing the SNC’s 
presence at the LAS is therefore not convincing. 
 
On top of that, like in the earlier periods, third parties hesitated to intervene in Syria, 
corresponding to H10. After the gas attack of August 2013, Russia and the US decided to 
chemically disarm Syria, but when the LAS asked for more measures, the UNSC did not listen. 
It took until February 2014 before the UNSC declared in a resolution that non-compliance 
would cause further steps, although even then those steps were unspecified. This could be 
because of the divisions within the UNSC that Annan referred to after his resignation, but that 
does not become clear from the sources. 
 
The LAS’ retreat: 31 May – 7 September 2014 
On the 25th of June 2014, Iraq asked the UNSC for help in the battle against the Islamic State 
in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Zebari, 2014). 
 
On 10 July 2014, the UN presented Staffan de Misutra as the new special envoy of the UN for 
Syria (UN office in Geneva, 2018). His predecessors had been joint special envoys of the UN 
and the LAS, but De Misutra only represented the UN. 
 
On July 14, the UNSC adopted a new resolution, in which it declared to be “appalled at the 
unacceptable and escalating level of violence and the death of more than 150,000 people”. It 
expressed “grave alarm” over indiscriminate attacks in urban areas and claimed that despite all 
efforts made, humanitarian aid did not reach all the people in need. Therefore, it decided to 
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send UN humanitarian agencies into Syria, together with a monitoring mission to ensure that 
the help would reach the right people. In case of non-compliance by any Syrian party, it was 
determined to take further measures, although it reaffirmed the council’s commitment to Syria’s 
sovereignty (UNSC, 2014c). 
 
The UNSC prohibited in a statement on 28 July 2014 the oil trade by terrorists in Iraq and Syria 
(UNSC, 2014d). A month later, it adopted another resolution condemning the recruitment of 
foreign fighters by ISIL and al-Nusra. It also imposed sanctions against six people and 
reaffirmed the council’s commitment to Syria’s sovereignty (UNSC, 2014e).   
 
On September 7, the LAS took the following decisions on a session (League of Arab States, 
2014). LAS members should help the countries that hosted Syrian refugees; they would work 
together to fight terrorism in general and ISIL in particular; they were concerned about the 
Syrian crisis and called the UNSC to take measures. They thanked Brahimi as former joint 
UN/LAS envoy for Syria and welcomed De Misutra as new UN envoy. They stressed the need 
to comply with the latest UNSC resolution and called donor states to contribute to humanitarian 
relief. Last, they requested a LAS committee to cooperate with the UN and present measures to 
the LAS “as it deems appropriate for relevant follow-up action on the part of Arab States”. 
 
On September 24, observers reported to the UNSC that between 19 August and 17 September, 
the violence had continued and the influence of ISIL had increased (UNSC, 2014f). 
 
Discussion 
In this final period, one important new factor played a role in the failure of the LAS to end the 
Syrian civil war: the rise of ISIL. This rise was possible since, contrary to H6, the government 
was not able to defeat the rebels. It lost control over large areas and extremists could profit from 
that. This caused spillover to Iraq, but since nothing is found about Iraq changing its attitude, 
this is not sufficient to meet H4. However, it distracted third parties from the other problems. 
The LAS and the UNSC took decisions to contain ISIL instead of to find a solution for the 
Syrian crisis. This is an inconsistency in the course of the LAS as predicted by H3 and seems 
to be the main reason behind the LAS’ retreat. 
 
On top of that, the LAS and the UNSC remained hesitant to intervene in Syria, as was predicted 
by H10. In the July 14 resolution, the UNSC reaffirmed commitment to Syria’s sovereignty, 
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and did not specify the measures that it intended to take in case of non-compliance. The LAS’ 
decisions on September 7 comprised passing the buck of the Syrian situation to the UNSC, in 
order to devolve the responsibility on another institution. 
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Conclusion 
 
By analyzing official statements and media accounts from the period 2011-2014, an attempt 
has been made to answer the question 
 Which factors contributed most to the failure of the LAS intervention in the Syrian civil 
 war? 
By doing that, a theory was tested that Gartner designed about the difficulties that regional IOs 
might face when they try to intervene in civil conflict in one of its member states. The theory 
provided ten hypotheses, which were compared to the actual events in the Syrian civil war. 
 
In the first period of investigation, when the LAS was mostly acting alone, two factors appear 
most clearly. First, the opposition was not willing to cooperate. Second, Russia and China 
vetoed a UNSC resolution twice. Therefore, this entire period, the LAS had to act alone, without 
help from the UN, whereas the Syrian regime might have felt more confident since it had the 
support of two permanent members of the UNSC. However, how the government felt was not 
addressed to in the sources, so that is speculation. 
 
In the period that Annan was the joint UN/LAS special envoy for Syria, the most important 
factor because of which the LAS failed to end the Syrian conflict was the unwillingness of the 
government to cooperate. Gartner talked in his theory only about unreliability of rebels, but 
here the government was unreliable as well. Also the indecisiveness of the UN to take severe 
measures was important. It could be considered a confirmation of H10, since a third party 
appeared unwilling to intervene. However, it may be better to concern it as a confirmation of 
H1: Russia appeared on Syria’s side, even by supplying it with weapons, which made the UNSC 
indecisive. Yet, this was a factor concerning the UN, not the LAS. The latter actively supported 
the rebels, thereby denying both H1 and H2, since it was not indecisive nor unacceptable to 
them. 
 
In the period that Brahimi was the joint special envoy, mostly the same factors played a role. 
The government remained unreliable, the rebels were unreliable as well and on top of that they 
were internally divided. The latter is in line with H8 from Gartner’s theory. Also the zero-
sumness of the conflict, as predicted in H9, contributed to the failure of the interventions. 
Contrary to the expectation of H2, that expected the rebels to depict the LAS as biased, the 
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government depicted Brahimi as biased for his support for the rebels. Nevertheless, in the end, 
this was not crucial for the process, since the government was. still willing to participate in the 
Geneva-II talks.  
 
Almost all this time, the LAS actively supported the rebels, denying both H1 and H3. However, 
in Spring 2014, it became divided about how much to encourage the rebels, which made it 
indecisive (H1) and its course inconsistent (H3). These internal divisions might be caused by 
the spillover of the conflict to neighboring countries, which H4 already expected, but since 
Jordan supported the rebels despite spillover, whereas Algeria did not, this hypothesis is not 
confirmed. Whether the UN was hesitant to intervene because of Syria’s sovereignty (H10) or 
due to internal divisions, like it was in the previous period, is difficult to conclude based on the 
used sources. 
 
In the last period, when the LAS halted its efforts to find a solution for Syria, this was mostly 
because of the rise of ISIL. The refusal of the UNSC to make clear which steps it would take 
in case of non-compliance can be seen as hesitation to intervene as expected in H10. 
 
So seen together, the unwillingness of the government to implement agreements and the 
unreliability and dividedness of the rebels are the main reasons that the LAS intervention failed 
in Syria. This is partly due to the zero-sumness of the conflict, which made concessions difficult 
to make. Furthermore, the hesitation of the UNSC to intervene played an important part. There 
are convincing indicators that the UNSC was internally divided, especially since Russia 
supported the Syrian government. The rise of ISIL was the factor that made the LAS retreat in 
the end. 
 
Comparing this to Gartner’s theory, a number of interesting remarks can be made. First, H1 
only applied in the last period, whereas H2 did not apply at all. The LAS acted decisively since 
it collectively supported the rebels, and Syria’s suspension and the LAS support for the rebels 
did not make the organization unacceptable as a mediator to any party. Concerning H3, within 
a year after the LAS changed its course away from entirely supporting the rebels, it completely 
halted its efforts, so that hypothesis is met, but for the final period only. For H4, there is one 
example (Lebanon) and one counterexample (Jordan), so no conclusion can be drawn from that.  
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H5 is interesting to mention here, for the research could falsify nor confirm it. This hypothesis 
concerns the tactics of the rebels, who are expected to play off third parties against each other, 
but their tactics were not primarily investigated. Mostly sources from the LAS, the UNSC and 
governmental correspondence were researched, since sources from the rebels were not available. 
The media accounts gave no indication that they used such a tactic, but that is not convincing 
enough to reject it. Therefore, it is impossible to conclude anything about H5. 
 
H6 and H7 are completely denied for the government was not far stronger than the rebels, but 
it was willing to negotiate; whereas H8, H9 and H10 were mostly met. As we see, the second 
group of hypotheses corresponds better to the Syrian case than the first, which implies that the 
nature of the conflict rather than the behavior of the LAS itself is to blame for the failure of the 
intervention. However, therefore it is remarkable that H6 and H7 did not apply.  
 
This shows that Gartner set out a series of unfavorable conditions for IO intervention, which 
are no laws of nature. The Syrian case differed a lot from his ideal model, but the intervention 
still failed. Parts of his theory turned out to be useful for the case, whereas other parts did not. 
Determining whether the latter are useful for other cases requires more research. 
 
Concerning H11, several factors appeared to play a role that Gartner’s theory did not foresee. 
First the unwillingness of the government to listen, second the Russian support for the 
government and last the rise of ISIL. However, the unwillingness of the government to listen 
can be caused by the zero-sumness of the conflict or the support of Russia, due to which 
obedience was not necessary. To determine that, more research is needed. 
 
The rise of international terrorism and the support of a permanent UNSC member are very 
specific factors for the Syrian situation. They could be incorporated in the theory, but that would 
require more research about civil wars in which one of the permanent UNSC-members supports 
one of the parties as well as civil wars in which a non-state actor starts being a threat to peace 
and stability in the larger region. Those researches would determine whether those factors can 
be added to theory, or were exceptional and only present in the Syrian case. 
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